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THE UNITED NATIONS AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

NOV 10 '48

U.S. Proposes Six Sponsoring Powers Discuss Atomic Energy Issues

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR WARREN R. AUSTIN IN COMMITTEE I¹

U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly

The resolution of Canada now before the Committee, provides in paragraph 1 for approval by the General Assembly of the Atomic Energy Commission's plan of control and prohibition as set forth in the general findings (part II C) and recommendations (part III) of the first report, and the specific proposals of part II of the second report of the Commission. The plan was developed by, and we believe has the support of, all the nations who have at any time served on the Atomic Energy Commission, with the exception of the Soviet Union, Poland, and the Ukraine; in other words, a majority of 14 states and a minority of 3.

The Soviets have recently announced that they would be willing to negotiate simultaneously two treaties which, as many speakers have already pointed out, would have to be closely interlocked. But the Soviet proposal does not alter the conditions necessary for effective control. These conditions remain the same. They are laid down in the two reports. They have been developed by the serious work of the delegates of 14 nations. They have been discussed with the Delegates of the Soviet Union for over two years. It would do no good to repudiate this work and start all over again, if indeed that were possible. The same facts, the same necessities, would require the same control. The facts of the problem, the nature of the fission process, indeed, the dual nature of U-235 and plutonium, which may be used either as fuels or as explosives, remains the same. The United States believes that the plan and present proposals of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission constitute the necessary basis for establishing

effective control of atomic energy and prohibition of atomic weapons and will vote accordingly for paragraph 2 of the Canadian resolution, which is a simple expression of fact. Paragraph 3 of the Canadian resolution deals with the problem of how to get negotiations started again, so as to complete the treaty or convention on which certain work remains to be done. The Canadian resolution proposes a solution.

A number of other solutions have been suggested to solve the problem. One proposed solution is that of the Soviet Union. The Soviets have proposed in their resolution that we repudiate the work of the past two and a half years and start all over again under the terms of reference laid down by the General Assembly in 1946. But the Soviets interpret these terms of reference in a manner different from the interpretation given by the majority of the Commission. The Soviets interpret these terms of reference to mean that prohibition and control must be put into effect, simultaneously, and that control be simultaneous on all control activities. Their position was made perfectly clear in the statements which the Soviet Delegate, Mr. Malik, made before the Subcommittee. He desired that other nations should agree to the simultaneous conclusion and bringing into force of two conventions, one for control and one for prohibition, and ". . . that the Atomic Energy Commission should resume its work on the basis of the resolution of the General Assembly of January 1946". He then said, concerning the sys-

¹ Made on Oct. 18, 1948, and released to the press on the same date.

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tem of stages contained in the General Assembly's resolutions of January 24, 1946, and I quote from the summary record of his remarks, "that system of stages had been intended to facilitate the studies of the Atomic Energy Commission but now the United Kingdom and the United States had given the system of stages another meaning: They extended it to the putting into effect of the system of control."

Putting together these two statements made by the Representatives of the Soviet Union during the meetings of the Subcommittee, we see that the so-called concession proposed by the Soviet Union had attached to it new conditions which were designed to commit the General Assembly to a system of control which would prevent the treaty going into effect by stages as required by the Commission. Such a proposal is not a concession. It is simply a maneuver designed to provide for the destruction of atomic weapons in one country before, and probably a long while before, there had been any determination of whether or not atomic weapons existed in another country. By demanding that prohibition be simultaneous with control, without any gradual steps or stages by which both prohibition and control would go into effect, the Soviet proposal would eliminate atomic weapons and explosives in one country many months, or perhaps years, before the system of control and inspection had been able to locate and determine the existence of atomic weapons and explosives in certain other countries. Such an arrangement would, of course, be wholly unacceptable. The majority of the Atomic Energy Commission have an entirely different view of the problem.

The majority believe that the terms of reference of the General Assembly clearly provide and make possible that the treaty should go into effect by stages. Moreover, the practical realities in putting controls into effect require time. In the words of the first report, which is part of the plan of the Commission: "The treaty or convention should embrace the entire program for putting the international system of control and inspection into effect, and should provide a schedule for the completion of the transition process over a period of time, step by step, in an orderly and agreed sequence leading to the full and effective establishment of international control of atomic energy".

These stages would, of course, include the step-by-step elimination of atomic arms coincident with the step-by-step establishment of control, leading to the final result of complete control, known elimination and enforceable prohibition. These steps or stages have not yet been laid down.

According to the Commission's third report no useful purpose would be served by trying to determine the form and timing of stages until the Soviet Union is ready to take a sincere part in the negotiations on the basis of accepted principles. We have been through this debate over and over again in the Atomic Energy Commission in the past two and a half years. It would not be possible nor reasonable to go back and start this debate all over again.

The Soviet resolution would commit the General Assembly to a course under which no majority of sincere men in the Atomic Energy Commission could develop an effective plan. It is wholly unacceptable. Another proposed solution to the problem of renewing negotiations is that proposed in the Indian resolution. That resolution provides that the Atomic Energy Commission would go back to work and complete the drafting of a treaty on the basis of the work already done. Those who drafted the Indian resolution hoped at first that the Soviet Union would cooperate in the work of the Commission on this basis and included such a clause in the resolution. But in the Subcommittee Mr. Malik said on October 11: "The U.S.S.R. do not agree with the provisions which is included in the Indian resolution, that there are indications that the situation which led to the closing of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission no longer exists". This clause had therefore to be omitted. The Indian resolution now means that the work should go on without the Soviet Union, but we do not agree that this would be a solution. Indeed, we believe that in the long run it would gravely set back the hope of agreement. In the matters which now remain for discussion, the political aspects are so important that it would be impractical and, we believe, harmful to discuss them except in full and open cooperation among all the major countries involved, and against the background of unanimous agreement on the majority plan as thus far developed.

Let us consider some of these matters which still remain to be agreed upon in detail in order to complete a treaty. There is the matter of sanctions. Under the plan proposed by the Soviet Union sanctions would be terribly important. The Soviet plan proposes the operation of nuclear plants by nations, with an international agency carrying out periodic inspections to see whether they are operating within the rules of technological exploitation agreed upon in the treaty, or set out by the agency. If these rules were violated, that is, if a nation made more nuclear fuel than the rules provided, the international agency would then make a recommendation to the Security Council. To set the matter right, the Security Council might have to employ sanctions. Such infractions by national plants would probably come up quite often, and sanctions would be continually and terribly important. Failure of the Security Council to act because of the veto, which is probable in certain cases, would create a most serious situation. Under the plan proposed by the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission all plants would be owned and operated by the international agency. The quota of nuclear fuels to be used for peaceful purposes would be defined in the treaty and the international agency would be required to carry out these treaty provisions. Under the Commission plan, major sanctions would only be required in the case of violations, such as seizure or refusal of inspection, which might be expected to occur only at rare intervals. In an atmosphere of cooperation in the basic elements of control, the matter of the veto could probably be worked out quite easily. Further elaboration of the veto matter by the majority without Soviet agreement and presented apart from consideration of the plan as a whole would tend to confirm present frictions.

Let us examine the matter of stages. Contrary to what seems to be the impression of the Soviet Delegates, judging from their remarks before this Committee, neither the first nor the second report of the Commission lays down the order of stages. The order of stages is one of the matters still to be agreed upon before a treaty can be completed. It surely is evident that the order of the stages will be greatly affected by the conditions of world secur-

rity existing at the time the treaty is to go into effect. For instance, the time at which disposal of atomic weapons would take place would depend upon the rapidity with which effective control could go into effect. This in turn would depend upon the openness existing between nations at the time the treaty was signed. If the Communist states were still a closed system, it would take time to open them up so that control could become effective. And make no mistake about it, such opening up is fundamental to effective control. But if the Communist states had already opened their borders to the extent now prevalent in other states, it would take much less time to establish controls, and disposal of weapons could take place much sooner.

To attempt to lay down stages now when agreement on other matters is so distant would only increase the suspicions and differences which now exist.

In the matter of staffing the organization, some discussions were held in the Commission just prior to the drafting of the third report. It was quickly apparent that no agreement could be reached on staffing, until the functions of the international agency were agreed upon. The Soviet Delegates themselves stated that further discussions of staffing were useless until agreement was reached on the functions of the proposed agency. Such discussions might indeed be harmful, since they would point up the differences and make later agreement more difficult.

For these and other reasons we were compelled to disagree with the point of view advanced in the Syrian resolution that work in the Commission might usefully go on, even though the Soviet were not taking part.

The United States holds firmly to the views so cogently expressed in the third report that no further progress can be made at the level of the Atomic Energy Commission until all the members of the Commission agree to accept, as constituting the necessary basis for further work, the reports as approved by the General Assembly. The United States further believes that since such acceptance is not now forthcoming, the best, and probably the only hope of obtaining it is by consultation among the sponsoring powers. This is the solution proposed in paragraph 3 of the Canadian resolution.

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It is because we so earnestly seek agreement, because we still hope for ultimate agreement, however dim the present prospects, that we strongly urge this course which would follow from the acceptance of the resolution now before us in its entirety.

In taking this position we will no doubt further increase the suspicions of the Soviet powers as to our motives. Other nations have said that the offer of the United States under certain conditions was a generous offer. But the Soviet Union have sought other motives to account for our strange action. The motive they seem unable to understand is our deep concern for the kind of world the American people desire to live in. The American people desire to live in a world where individual human beings, as well as independent nations, great and small, have the greatest possible liberty and freedom consonant with the liberty and freedom of others. They desire to live in a world where all men are equal under the law. As a means to these ends and as an end in itself, they seek a world in which there is openness among all nations, freedom to move easily across national borders, freedom of information, and a free exchange of scientific and cultural ideas among the nations.

That is the kind of world the people of the United States desire. It is towards that kind of world that United States foreign policy is oriented and towards which we are earnestly striving. We envisage such a world in the field of atomic energy. It is envisaged by the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in the plan which is now presented to the General Assembly. In the field of atomic energy no effective control is possible except in such a world. Unless we all consider this matter on the basis of these realities, we are only laying up dangers for the future.

Over two years ago the United States made an offer to give up its atomic weapons, its great plants for making the explosives which are used in atomic weapons, and for making the nuclear fuels which may at some later date provide power for industry, and offered to give up its knowledge derived at such great expense and from such long years of study, so that there would no longer be any secrets in this field, and all its knowledge

would be open to all the world. The United States made one condition to this offer. It is a serious condition.

That condition is that there should be set up an effective, enforceable, international system of control and prohibition. This is consistent within the policy by which the Atomic Energy Commission of the United States is governed. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 provides in Section 10 (a) (1) "That until Congress declares by joint resolution that effective and enforceable international safeguards against the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes have been established, there shall be no exchange of information with other nations with respect to the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes". In practice the condition would mean that the world would be thrown open to a broad exchange of information, to a considerable free movement of persons, so that effective, enforceable control of atomic energy would be made possible.

These conditions must be fulfilled. Therefore, the second subparagraph of Section 10 (a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, would go into effect: "(2) That the dissemination of scientific and technical information relating to atomic energy should be permitted and encouraged so as to provide that free interchange of ideas and criticisms which is essential to scientific progress". The United States does not intend to give up its atomic weapons except under a system of control sufficiently effective to guarantee that other nations do not have, and cannot secure, these weapons. We believe that the majority of the nations of the world support us in this position. We believe that the majority of the nations want this same kind of open world which is desired by the United States.

In the light of what I have just said, the situation in which the Atomic Energy Commission now finds itself is much more difficult than mere disagreement on the details of negotiations. The situation which has led to the impasse in the Atomic Energy Commission has been clearly analyzed in the third report of the Atomic Energy Commission. This analysis is based on the firm conclusions of the Commission after over 30 months of negotiation. It is an analysis which honesty and forthrightness require us all to appreciate. It brings us down to the plain realities

of the situation with which we are faced. This is not a temporary breakdown in negotiations which can be remedied by further discussions at the level of the Atomic Energy Commission. This situation is caused by the refusal of the Soviet Union to participate in the world community on a co-operative basis.

The Communist states have set up a closed system and over a large area of the world have drawn an Iron Curtain behind which things go on in secret, things of which the rest of the world is properly suspicious. So long as the Communist states continue this position, effective international control of atomic energy will be impossible. So long as the Communist states continue this system of secrecy, the safeguards which other nations deem indispensable cannot be made effective. So long as this situation continues, all the world will be suspicious of Soviet motives and will, of necessity, arm against unknown dangers.

The Communist states desire to live in a secret world of their own, behind which, for all we know, they may arm and prepare their people for war. We do not desire to live in such a world. That is the impasse in which the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission finds itself. This is the im-

passe which cannot be overcome by the Atomic Energy Commission. It can be overcome only by the aroused, the insistent consecration, the moral—not mechanical—majority of free men who have a right to insist that they remain free.

The basis on which the work of the Atomic Energy Commission might be resumed should be discussed, so it seems to us, not in a technical body such as the Atomic Energy Commission, but in consultation among the six sponsoring powers who first proposed to the General Assembly that this matter be undertaken by the United Nations and who should now find a means for its continuance. If they find this means, the Atomic Energy Commission would be immediately reconvened. But if the sponsoring powers should not be successful, they must report to the General Assembly, which will then decide what steps should next be taken.

We believe that this would be the best means of bringing about that for which we all so devoutly hope, the reconvening of the Atomic Energy Commission under conditions which will result in the completion of a treaty acceptable to all nations. The United States will vote for the Canadian resolution in its entirety.

U.S. Accepts Atomic Energy Resolution

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR WARREN R. AUSTIN IN COMMITTEE I¹

Mr. President, The United States will acquiesce in the amended resolution which has now been accepted by Australia. That is to say, the Canadian resolution as it shows on A/C.1/340. However, I want it clear that we adhere to the principles and policies that we have advocated throughout this debate. We are not retracing our steps or retreating from the position that we have stated here several times. We are firmly persuaded that the report of the Atomic Energy Commission, the third report, represents the fact when it says:

"In this situation the Commission concludes that no useful purpose can be served by carrying on negotiations at the Commission level".

Why is that so? Well, the Commission states why it is so, namely, and I am quoting:

"The failure to achieve agreement on the international control of atomic energy arises from a situation that is beyond the competence of this Commission".

In other words, it is the same deep-seated political division separating East from West and the Commission found, after long experience, that was a constant barrier to accomplishments of agreement, of cooperation, and collaboration upon this vital question in the Atomic Energy Commission. Therefore, it recommended a suspension—not the kind of suspension which my friend Colo-

¹ Made on Oct. 19, 1948, and released to the press on the same date.

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nel Hodgson speaks of—that is, indefinitely suspended. On the contrary, it expressly recommended a limitation and it used the word “until”. That is probably why the word “when” was used in this resolution as it was originally drafted. It was the appropriate word and referred to the recommendation of the Commission. Now, this is what they recommended:

“The Atomic Energy Commission therefore recommends that until such time as the General Assembly finds that this situation no longer exists or until such time as the sponsors of the General Assembly resolution of 24 January, 1946, who are the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission, find, through prior consultation that there exists a basis for agreement on the international control of atomic energy, negotiations in the Atomic Energy Commission be suspended.”

Now, that is plain English and anybody that interprets that to mean an indefinite suspension is straining the English language. That is a suspension only until certain events occur and it contemplates something constructive being done. The resolution offered here and under consideration up to this point recommended what had the most promise of accomplishment in it. That is, consideration of those factors which were in the way of agreement in the place where they have to be considered, that is, on a higher level entirely.

Now, it developed here that this little undercurrent ran through this great Committee—anxiety that the project of international control was being given up—indefinitely suspended—and so many amendments reached toward something that would give hope and assurance to the world that that was not going to take place.

Now, believe me, the United States respects the opinion of its colleagues on this Committee and when it sees a movement of opinion like that around this table, it gives attention to it. And, notwithstanding the fact that we still believe firmly that the only place where we can unravel this tangle—the tangled threads—is on a higher

level, nevertheless, we are going to acquiesce in the obvious feelings of this Committee. We are going with you. Don’t let anybody assert that the United States tries to coerce or force its opinion. I can give you evidence now, this minute, to the contrary. We are going to vote for this although we still adhere to the opinion expressed in that report of the Atomic Energy Commission and supported by our endeavors here with all the strength we have.

Mr. President, I think it would be the gravest error to slip back to February 1947 and merge control of atomic-energy studies with conventional armaments. This is an old fight which was finished, we thought, in the Security Council in February 1947, and yet we see it raising its head from time to time. Just why should we mix this work all up? Why should we set back what has been gained? It is a great study that has been carried forward for thirty months with a definite report of progress. Now, are we going to give it strength? Are we going to have it carried on with the moral approbation of the largest number of countries in the United Nations, or are we going to weaken it in every way that we can? For example, put in here proof of it—the words “in substance” or the words “in principle”. Weasel words to tear down that which we are reaching for? We cannot get anything more out of the General Assembly than its moral power. We must reach for all the moral strength that we can have to support this very intelligent accomplishment of the Atomic Energy Commission—for it is the accomplishment of the Commission, you understand. The majority rule obtained there and it is only by the strangest attitude towards democratic principles that we find a small minority persistently resisting the decision of the Atomic Energy Commission.

So, we now give our allegiance to this amendment—this amended resolution of Canada here—provided it is not mangled by amendments or by some conduct of this Committee that would rob it of the only thing that there is in it, and, that is, the moral power of the General Assembly.

Review of Allied Action on Berlin Blockade

STATEMENT BY PHILIP C. JESSUP¹

Deputy U.S. Representative in the Security Council

The distinguished representative of the United Kingdom has given the Council a complete review of the facts of the complex blockade measures imposed by the Soviet Union over a period of months. These are actions which were designed to deprive the Western powers of their legal rights in Berlin and force the German capital into the Soviet economic and political system. These are acts which taken as a whole constitute duress and threat of force, such as are wholly inconsistent with the obligations imposed on members of the United Nations by the Charter.

At the very moment in which the Security Council is considering the blockade, Soviet authorities have taken additional steps to tighten it. They announced in Berlin yesterday that, effective as of yesterday, all vehicles coming from the Soviet zone into Berlin must enter through the Soviet sector. In other words, as regards vehicular traffic into the Western sectors of Berlin, a watertight blockade has now been clamped about the perimeter of the city. The manner in which these measures have been taken provides a striking illustration of the Soviet blockade methods. Suddenly, without prior warning, a police cordon is thrown around an area comprising two thirds of Berlin. Instead of a simple reasonable system of inspection at the point of entry, a vehicle must detour 40 or 50 miles in order to enter the city from the east. Instead of the use of an agreed-upon documentation for the entry of this vehicle, it must possess unspecified and unilaterally decreed papers. Its ultimate fate, should it persist in wishing to enter the West sectors from the Soviet sector, is seizure of the vehicle and its cargo, including food. We are informed, indeed, that yesterday patrols of police in the Soviet sector began inspecting all vehicles trying to enter the West sectors. One thing emerges

clearly from these announcements and actions: the blockade not only exists, but is being intensified. The duress of which we complained and which is a bar to negotiations is being increased even as the Security Council deliberates.

There is an aspect of the blockade measures which I particularly wish to be re-emphasized to members of the Council. As I pointed out before, under a series of international agreements the four occupying powers undertook responsibilities for the population of the sectors of Berlin committed to their charge. The blockade is a method used by the Soviet Union for the expansion of its power in utter disregard of these joint responsibilities and with callous indifference to the effect of their measures upon the population of the Western sectors. I would also remind the Council that it was not until a month after the blockade was imposed that the Soviet Union made their offer to supply food and coal to the Western sector. It was thus clear that they originally contemplated putting this pressure on the population in an attempt to break their spirit, and it was only after the success of the air lift was demonstrated that the attempt was made to counter the air lift with the offer of Soviet supplies.

This is the blockade which Vyshinsky says is entirely mythical.

His contention that there is no blockade has been amply disproved by facts. The Soviet interpretation will in any event be somewhat disputed by two and one-half million people who are the direct object of Soviet power politics, who are faced with a choice between accepting the real and potential hardships of the blockade or accepting Soviet political food and political coal and hence

¹ Made before the Security Council on Oct. 19, 1948, and released to the press on the same date.

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Soviet and Communist political domination. Their choice has been clear and unmistakable from the beginning. They have chosen hardship and freedom. This is a hopeful sign for the future peace and security of Europe, for the sake of which the Four Powers undertook the occupation of Germany. Let us not forget that at Potsdam it was declared that the Allies will take in agreement together, now and in the future, the other measures necessary to assure that Germany never again will threaten her neighbors or the peace of the world. It is not the intention of the Allies to destroy or enslave the German people. It is the intention of the Allies that the German people be given the opportunity to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis. That was agreed at Potsdam. The Soviet Government, using the harsh instrument of the blockade, has indeed chosen a strange way in Berlin to live up to its agreement to democratize German political life. Thanks to the air bridge and the support given it by Berliners, the Soviet Government has not succeeded in its purpose.

Let us get down to the bare bones of the matter. There is Berlin, an island in the midst of the Soviet zone. By international agreement Berlin is a city under the administration of four countries—France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It is not a Russian city. Officials and troops of four countries are in that city carrying out their duties in the several sectors assigned to them by international agreement. Questions affecting the city as a whole, under those same agreements, are supposed to be controlled by the four countries acting together in the Control Council and Kommandatura—two bodies which they set up for that purpose. In 1945 all four agreed that all four should share in bringing essential supplies of food, fuel, etc., to Berlin and in distributing those supplies in Berlin.

For about three years this island city of Berlin was administered under these agreements. Then in 1948, for one reason or another (I shall not now pause to review the evidence which shows what the reason was; the varying and inconsistent reasons advanced by the Soviet command for these restrictions have already been revealed), the Soviet

Union, one of the Four Powers, walked out of the Control Council and Kommandatura and began to close the routes to Berlin. All these routes, by rail, road, and canal, cross the Soviet zone territory to reach Berlin. The Soviet Army is stationed all through that territory and therefore is in the physical position to prevent traffic from crossing it. They have not *the right* to prevent this traffic because they agreed that France, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the U. K. and the U. S. should all share in administering Berlin, and Premier Stalin himself in 1945 agreed that they had a right to go in and out of Berlin to and from their own zones. But the Soviet Union has the physical power and has threatened to use it. It does not have the same physical power of control over the air and therefore the three Western Governments are using air lanes. The air lift has imposed tremendous additional burdens upon the three Western powers who have exactly the same right as the Soviet Union to be in Berlin. But if we three Western countries had been unwilling to make that effort, we would be defaulting on our recognized responsibilities for the economic and political welfare of the Berlin population. It is not unreasonable to assume that the objective of the Soviet Union is to place the Western powers in a position where they cannot carry out those responsibilities. It is absurd for the Soviet Union to argue that there is no blockade merely because we can still reach our own sectors of Berlin by air or because they belatedly offered to supply food in exchange for political control.

One does not need to be an expert on the Charter to realize that the use of physical power backed by armed force in an attempt to prevent us from going where we have a right to be and where we have international duties to perform, is a violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations. If the Soviet Union had complaints against the three Western countries, the whole system of the Charter clearly requires them to try to settle these differences by peaceful means. Did they try to do so? They did not.

From the beginning of 1948 until their surface blockade became complete, they never suggested that we have a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to discuss the broad questions of the

future of Germany. From the time they withdrew from the Control Council in March 1948, they never suggested negotiations by any other body. Instead they used the extreme measure of the blockade.

Some people may think there was no real threat of force because they did not actually open up on our trains and trucks and barges with machine guns and artillery. But let me give you a picture as presented by an actual case. On June 21, 1948, United States military train no. 20, under command of an American officer and carrying one warrant officer and an interpreter and six train guards, left Helmstedt en route to Berlin.

Despite the fact that it had complied with all agreed regulations, the train was stopped at the Russian control point. There were three days of argument during which Russian demands were frequently altered. Finally the Russian commandant ordered all U. S. personnel off the rail property, which he claimed was under Soviet control and onto guard cars. Two American guards were forced off the U. S. engine by a Russian colonel and two armed Russian guards. Other Russian guards with automatic guns were placed beside the train in various spots. Soviet guards rode the train to the border point where they alighted and the train proceeded back to Helmstedt.

Now as I pointed out to the Security Council before, we could have used armed force against this Soviet threat or we could have meekly submitted and surrendered our rights and duties in Berlin, subjecting nearly two and one-half million Germans to Soviet rule with all that that implies. What we actually did and are still doing is live up to our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and to try to settle the question by peaceful discussions while continuing to discharge our obligations in Berlin.

This leads me to the second question which has been put to us. I quote it:

"We request the representatives of the U. S. A., the U. K., France, and the Soviet Union to explain circumstantially the agreement involved in the instructions given to the Military Governors of the Powers in Berlin and to give the detailed reasons

that prevented the implementation of those instructions."

The Soviet Government will, however, appreciate that the three Governments are unable to negotiate in a situation which the Soviet Government has taken the initiative in creating. Free negotiations can only take place in an atmosphere relieved of pressure. This is the issue; the present restrictions upon communications between Berlin and the Western zones offend against this principle. When this issue is resolved, such difficulties as stand in the way of a resumption of conversations on lines set out should be removed.

I have already given the Council on October 6 an outline of the discussions which followed.² I shall repeat the essential points.

At the close of the meeting on August 2, Stalin seemed to meet our point of view. He proposed that lifting restrictions on transport and commerce should be carried out simultaneously with the introduction in Berlin of the German mark of the Soviet zone and the withdrawal from Berlin of the Western mark "B".

The three Western Governments assumed that Stalin's proposal was based on the establishment of Four Power control over currency in Berlin and therefore could be accepted. Accordingly, in the next meeting with Molotov on August 6 the three Western Representatives suggested that a communiqué should be agreed upon by the Four Governments which would announce the lifting of the blockade, the introduction into Berlin of the German mark of the Soviet zone as the sole currency of the city, under adequate Four Power control, and an agreement to hold a Four Power meeting to consider outstanding questions with respect to Berlin and Germany. This document will be found in our White Paper.³ You will note that it was a simple proposal and, in addition to the points I have just mentioned, spelled out Four Power safeguards with respect to currency which we considered essential.

The Soviets did not accept immediately the draft communiqué. Instead, protracted discus-

² BULLETIN of Oct. 17, 1948, p. 884.

³ Department of State publication 3298.

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sions were held between the Four Powers over a three-week period until the directive was agreed to on August 30. I think it unnecessary to give here a detailed chronological account of those discussions. That account is given in the White Papers which have been published by the United States Government and by the British Government. If you will compare the proposals made by the Three Powers on August 6 with the agreed directive, differences between them will be clear.

When agreement was reached on August 30 as to the terms of the directive, the U.S. Government believed that no more than administrative acts by technical experts in Berlin were required to carry out the directive. There had been an exhaustive discussion on all issues of principle in the directive. So far as we knew full accord had been reached. The only thing that remained was to put into effect the principles agreed upon which we assumed could be done by the four Military Governors.

The directive met the points made by the Soviet Government in Moscow and at the same time was consistent with the maintenance of our rights in Berlin.

Stalin gave specific assurances on the question of Four Power control over currency in the August 23 meeting with Representatives of the three Western Governments.

As reported by Smith:

"Stalin stated that the German bank of emission controlled the flow of currency throughout the whole Soviet zone, and it was impossible to exclude Berlin from the Soviet zone. However, if the question were asked whether it did so without being controlled itself, the answer was 'no'. Such control would be provided by the Financial Commission and by the four Commanders in Berlin, who would work out arrangements connected with the exchange of currency and with the control provision of currency, and would supervise what the bank was doing."

No unresolved issues of substance appeared to be involved on August 30 when the directive was sent to the four Military Governors in Berlin.

But what was our experience in Berlin?

In answering this question, one needs remember what the situation was when the discussions be-

gan. The beginning was on July 6 when the three Governments sent the first notes to the Soviets. By that time, the Soviet interruption of highway, railroad, and canal traffic was complete and the three Western powers had been forced to resort to the air lift to carry out their acknowledged duties in Berlin. This was the situation creating a threat to the peace which still exists, and which will continue to exist until the restrictions of surface travel are removed. For over three months we have been trying to remove this threat to the peace by peaceful means. When direct discussions failed, we turned to the Security Council, which by the Charter has been given the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

We turned to the Security Council on September 29 for exactly the same reason that we entered into the discussions with the Soviet Government in July, namely, to remove the threat to the peace. We did not come to the Security Council in July, because article 33 of the Charter required us "first of all" to exhaust the possibility of direct discussion. But the threat to the peace existed in July as it exists now in October.

In July we wondered whether there were some detail, some misunderstanding, which caused the Soviet Government, however improperly and illegally, to use force instead of conference. If that were the case, the difficulty could be removed. If, however, as all signs seemed to indicate, the Soviet Union was using the threat of force to get us out of Berlin, that was a different matter. So we put the question to Stalin on August 2 in Moscow. Smith, of the U. S., spoke for the three Governments. I want to quote his words which you will find printed in full in the U. S. White Paper:

"The United States, the United Kingdom and France do not wish the situation to deteriorate further and assume that the Soviet Government shares this desire. The Three Governments have in mind restrictive measures which have been placed by Soviet authorities on communication between the Western zones of Germany and Western sectors of Berlin. It was the feeling of our Governments that if these measures arose from technical difficulties, such difficulties can be easily remedied. The Three Governments renew their

offer of assistance to this end. If in any way related to the currency problem, such measures are obviously uncalled for, since this problem could have been, and can now be, adjusted by representatives of the four powers in Berlin. If, on the other hand, these measures are designed to bring about negotiations among the four occupying powers they are equally unnecessary, since the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and France have never at any time declined to meet representatives of the Soviet Union to discuss questions relating to Germany. However, if the purpose of these measures is to attempt to compel the three Governments to abandon their rights as occupying powers in Berlin, the Soviet Government will understand from what has been stated previously that such an attempt could not be allowed to succeed."

Smith went on to say:

"In spite of recent occurrences, the three powers are unwilling to believe that this last reason is the real one. Rather they assume that the Soviet Government shares their view that it is in the interest of all four occupying powers, of the German people and of the world in general to prevent any further deterioration of the position and to find a way by mutual agreement to bring to an end the extremely dangerous situation that has developed in Berlin."

The record shows that the Soviet Military Governor departed from the directive on three fundamental matters of principle. First, he asserted that the use of the air corridors to Berlin from the west would be limited to supplying the needs of the occupation forces; but the directive called for the lifting of restrictions, not the imposition of new ones. Second, he maintained that the trade of Berlin with the Western occupation zones and third countries should be controlled exclusively by the Soviet Military Command, but the directive provided that a "satisfactory basis" of trade should be worked out rather than unilateral control. Third, the Soviet Commander insisted that the Four Power Financial Commission would not have the necessary authority with respect to the activities in Berlin of the German bank of emission

despite the explicit understanding to the contrary reached with Stalin August 23 on this point.

The three Western Governments decided to take these issues back to Moscow to determine whether the Soviet Government itself was also going to disregard the agreements which had been reached.

However, in going back to Moscow, we did believe that it was essential to obtain an unequivocal affirmation by the Soviet Government of the principles of the August 30 directive. We were not prepared to embark on another round of long discussion which would simply reproduce what had gone before and which would open for further discussion principles previously settled. We wanted unequivocal answers to the three questions. We then wanted performance on those answers in Berlin. What happened when we went back to Moscow?

The three Western Governments requested in their *aide-mémoire* of September 14 that the Soviet Government affirm the understanding reached in Moscow concerning those three issues and instruct the Soviet Military Governor to carry out these undertakings. A reply was received by the three Western Representatives in Moscow on September 18. In that reply the Soviet Government upheld the position of the Soviet Military Governor to the effect that the use of the air corridors in the future be limited to supplying the requirements of the occupation forces in Berlin contrary to the Control Council decision of November 30, 1945. While admitting that the trade of Berlin should be under Four Power control, the Soviet Government maintained that actual issuance of export-import licenses should be controlled by the Soviet military administration. This would have vitiated Four Power control over trade. The reply seemed to go back to acceptance of the principle that the Financial Commission would have authority only over certain activities in Berlin of the German bank of emission.

It is evident that we did not obtain the simple affirmation we sought of the agreed principles of the August 30 directive. Nor did we obtain any assurance that the Soviet Government would instruct the Soviet Military Governor to follow the directive. In short, we obtained an unsatisfactory reply. In view of all that had happened before,

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we came to the considered opinion that the Soviet Government was attempting to secure political objectives to which it was not entitled and which it could not achieve by peaceful means. We discovered that the talks we were holding were serving as an excuse to prolong the blockade rather than as a means of removing it.

Therefore, on September 22, the three Western Governments sent identic notes to the Soviet Government in which they restated their positions on the three principal issues and in which they also asked the Soviet Government to lift the blockade and specify the date on which it would be done.⁴

The Soviet reply to this note was received on September 25.⁵ It still did not explicitly clarify all of the points which we had taken back to Moscow. It did not state that the Soviet Government agreed that commercial freight and passengers could move to Berlin by air. It did, perhaps, imply that the air corridors might be used for this purpose. However, it stated that there must be control by the Soviet High Command over the transport of commercial cargoes and passengers. The Soviet reply thus raised a new question. We could not agree that the Soviet Command should exercise such control. We had stated repeatedly in Berlin that inspection for protection of currency would be necessary but that it must be exercised on the basis of agreed quadripartite regulations.

I want to point out that in the circumstances existing in Berlin, protection of the currency of the Soviet zone is wholly unrelated to the volume of freight or the number of passengers moving by land, water, or air between the Western zones and Berlin. Protection for currency of the Soviet zone, as a practical matter, can be had through adequate exchange and currency controls as between the two areas, not through control of traffic. The Governments of France, the U.K., and the U.S. have always been prepared to agree to reasonable safeguards for the protection of the Soviet zone German mark. They have always been and still are prepared to agree to reasonable regula-

tions over traffic. Limitation of and control over the volume of traffic that moves between the Western zones and Berlin should not be confused with the wholly separate and unrelated question of currency and exchange control. The Soviets have used this as one of their excuses for establishing the blockade and as reason for claiming the right to impose restrictions on the use of air corridors for transportation of freight and passengers. This is a subterfuge on the part of the Soviets to place air traffic and Berlin under control of the Soviet Command.

Because further talks had become manifestly futile, we informed the Soviet Government that we were referring the matter to the Security Council in our identic notes of September 26-27. We sent our notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on September 29.⁶

As you are aware, the Soviet Government sent a note to the three Western Governments on October 3, even after we had referred the case to the United Nations. That note is a further illustration of the tactics which have been pursued by the Soviet Government throughout these talks. It suggests for example that the matter of air-traffic control to prevent illegal currency and smuggling operations should be capable of mutually satisfactory negotiation but it carefully refrains from making a definite commitment. It is another example of the evasions, and apparent unwillingness to affirm understandings already reached.

Now we are asked why was it that the whole matter was not settled on the basis of the directive of August 30. Stated in another way, the question is, "Why did the threat to peace continue after September 7 when conversations of the four Military Governors were concluded, or after the 14th of September when the three Western Governments wrote the Soviet Government explaining in what respects Sokolovsky had refused to live up to the understanding reached in Moscow?"

A simple and direct answer to the question is that the threat to peace did not end then because it was the Soviet blockade measures which caused the threat to peace and the Soviet Government refused to lift the blockade. The Soviet Government created the threat to peace and the Soviet Government can remove it.

⁴ BULLETIN of Oct. 3, 1948, p. 423.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ U.N. doc. S/1020, Sept. 29, 1948. See also BULLETIN of Oct. 10, 1948, p. 455.

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To sum up, the three Western powers were prepared to discuss practical arrangements to deal with the currency problem in Berlin or other problems as long as there was the slightest reason to believe that the restrictions imposed by the Soviet Government were in any way related to such problems. But when it became apparent as the conversations progressed and particularly after the Soviet repudiation of the agreed interpretation of the August 30th directive, that the real Soviet intention was to force the abandonment of our rights in Berlin, which Stalin had been informed was totally unacceptable to the Western powers, it was obvious that the discussions were doomed to failure. In our view these discussions prove conclusively and we so stated in our notes of

September 26-27 that the Soviet Government was and is attempting by illegal and coercive measures in disregard of its obligations to secure political objectives to which it is not entitled and which it could not achieve by peaceful means. We could not continue to discuss even on the currency question under a clearly established attempt to attain such objectives by coercion and duress.

In demanding the immediate lifting of the blockade which constitutes a threat to peace, we in no way seek to be released from our commitment to carry out the directive of August 30. We are asking the Security Council to remove the threat to the peace, not to avoid a discussion with the Soviet Government, but to make it possible to engage in discussions free from duress.

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¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York City. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

United Nations Day

STATEMENTS BY SECRETARY MARSHALL¹

With the other members of the United States Delegation, I am attending in Paris the third regular session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. For five weeks this has been a period of extraordinary activity, as we have been dealing daily with matters of utmost world concern. Make no mistake about it, what is being done here has a profound meaning for every American.

It is fortunate, I think, that United Nations Day is being observed while the General Assembly is in session. The critical nature of issues we are debating should cause the people of the world to think both seriously and realistically about what the United Nations really is and what people may rightfully expect it to accomplish in their behalf—that is, in behalf of world peace.

The most vivid impression I have received in the past few weeks is the new appreciation of the indispensable part the organization of the United Nations has come to play in the affairs of the world community. I wish I could convey to all of you at home the stirring sense of reality and vitality we feel from participating in these meetings. Certainly no one here doubts that they are part of an organization engaged in the most important business in the world today—that is, an intense effort to save this and succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

But we realize that the United Nations cannot hope to succeed unless it boldly comes to grips with the realities of the world situation. It cannot exist merely as a symbol above and apart from human struggle. If the organization is to justify the hopes of mankind, it must gather strength to surmount the difficulties, the crises of the world, and bring about peaceful solutions for them.

The most important fact of international life today which every country must take into account is the fact that the United Nations is a living, dynamic institution. This does not mean that we

can find solutions for all our complicated international problems easily and automatically by referring them to the United Nations, nor does it mean that we should lose our perspective—or fear that doomsday is just around the corner if the United Nations does not provide quick and satisfactory solutions. Some of these problems have already defied the ingenuity of Member Nations that make up the United Nations, and because the United Nations is inseparably a part of the real imperfect world in which it exists it is subject to the same disabilities and frustrations that beset the negotiations of its individual members. We would make a fundamental error if we disregarded these realities and considered the United Nations as some short cut to Utopia. There is neither a short cut nor a Utopia. We live in a human world with all man's frailties and failings, which I have come to think are more pronounced in nations than in individuals.

The United Nations Charter recites specific limitations which were passed on by the fifty nations that created the organization. The United Nations is in no sense a supergovernment. It does not have complete authority over sovereign nations which compose its membership. They did voluntarily agree to cooperate within the provisions of the limited authority conferred upon it by the Charter, but the achievements of the United Nations are limited to the willingness of various nations to cooperate. The difficulties, successes, and failures of the United Nations directly reflect existing relationships among nations.

The attention of our people has been focused on political disputes debated in the Security Council and the excessive use of the veto in that organization. This has led to an impatient desire to force hasty revision or even complete overhauling of the whole United Nations machinery. Many of these proposals are unrealistic in that they confuse cause with effect. They propose cures for symptom instead of for disease. The truth is that the means for cooperation provided by the United Nations are not, I repeat, are not inadequate—it is a lack of genuine desire for cooperation on the part of certain nations that brings about the present feeling of futility and frustration.

¹The first statement was made over the CBS network on the occasion of the observance of United Nations Day, Oct. 24, 1948, and released to the press on the same date. The second statement was made to American students on the occasion of United Nations Week over the NBC network on Oct. 22, 1948, and released to the press on the same date.

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This obstructive attitude or procedure is the most serious limitation of all, it is the greatest blight on the effectiveness of the United Nations. It has been imposed contrary to the wishes of the majority of the Member nations, and contrary to understandings reached in San Francisco. Yet the United Nations unquestionably represents the maximum degree of international cooperation that is possible at this time.

The way to increase the cooperative spirit is not by deliberately destroying the inadequate unity that now exists, but rather by careful and patient cultivation of greater unity through the processes of the United Nations.

Always keep in mind that the United Nations today provides the forum in which world opinion can be brought to bear on the most critical world disputes. In time the cumulative effect of moral judgments of the large majority of mankind expressed through the organization will inevitably exert a powerful influence upon even the most recalcitrant government.

I am addressing you from Paris, where the United States is taking an active part in the deliberations of the United Nations. This meeting is dealing with serious problems in world affairs, some of which will affect your personal lives for years to come.

I wish it were possible for me to meet you personally, in your gatherings at schools throughout our country, to impress on you the great importance of the organization of the United Nations and the duty you owe to yourself and your country to help strengthen the United Nations and make of it a tremendous influence for peace in the world.

The people of our country have just passed through a terrible war in defense of our right to live in freedom and to govern ourselves as we see fit. Great sacrifices were made, hundreds of thousands of lives of our young men given to keep for us and for future Americans the kind of liberty

The United States will associate itself with as much of the world as will sincerely devote its efforts to the realization of the aims proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations. Our government is resolved to seek peace and understanding in accordance with the Charter both inside and outside the United Nations. We will not allow misuse of United Nations procedures or obstruction of our efforts, singly or in concert with other nations, to dismay or defeat us.

I urge all Americans to observe United Nations Day in a practical manner by increasing their knowledge and understanding of the organization, particularly the Charter. The United Nations was born out of world disaster and has had to be nurtured during continuing crises. Given a reasonable opportunity the United Nations will grow and develop through other crises to its maturity. That is the way of civilization. There is no better road—no shorter—in fact, there is no other road—to lasting peace.

and ways of life that have been so wonderfully developed in America.

Now we are engaged in a great effort to save succeeding generations from the scourge and horrors of war and to bring progress and prosperity to the world. Our efforts are centered on the United Nations, the world's best hope for peace.

We only began this great enterprise three years ago. We must look to you to carry it forward to strength and power. You are young. You have a fresh viewpoint and vigor. Make the United Nations your own organization by learning all you can about it, what it is, what its purposes are, how it operates. Read the Charter and re-read it, until you understand it as thoroughly as you do our own Constitution. Identify yourself with the United Nations and work unceasingly to make it the means by which you and the young people of other lands can live together in peace and happiness in the years ahead.

ADDRESS BY GEORGE V. ALLEN:

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

I am glad to talk with you tonight about the United Nations because many people who read the daily headlines, reporting disputes in the General Assembly in Paris, are inclined to overlook the really significant developments now taking place. Many people are skeptical that any progress can be made, under present world conditions, towards the creation of an effective world organization,

but progress *is* being made toward that end every day.

Today, in Paris, the spokesmen of the world are debating ways and means by which nations can work creatively toward building an effective

* Address broadcast over WRC in Washington on Oct. 22, 1948, and released to the press on the same date.

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peace. A large majority of the hundreds of delegates present are showing more and more clearly, when the chips are down, that they appreciate the necessity for preserving the dignity and worth of the individual, and are aware that an effective world organization can only be built on democratic principles.

In each debate in Paris, this issue is becoming more clear cut. We are getting down to rock bottom. The question of the control of Berlin is incidental to the basic question whether anti-democratic methods of force and coercion shall be permitted to continue as a means of conducting international relations. As the various individual cases are discussed, this basic issue underlying them all emerges more clearly.

The fact that more and more people of the world are steadily realizing the fundamental question involved is more important to me than the political disagreements which are hitting the headlines. The quarrel is not between the United States and Russia; it is between democracy and totalitarianism, between aggression and nonaggression, between moral and immoral international conduct.

But the political debates in Paris by no means tell the whole United Nations story. The Security Council, as "trouble shooter" for the United Nations, receives most of the headlines, but the less spectacular day-to-day advancements made by the United Nations and by its specialized agencies in social and economic fields are perhaps equally important.

A vast new machinery of international cooperation has come into being since 1945. A study of the United Nations organization chart will reveal commissions, councils, and special agencies

which offer Member Nations a meeting ground to attack almost every type of common problem, such as the control of contagious diseases, educational reconstruction, and many others of equal importance. Some people think there are too many such agencies and bureaus, but each is important, and their constant if quiet endeavors and achievements add up to a significant total. In some of these agencies, delegates of widely divergent political views work in close technical cooperation and harmony.

This, very briefly to be sure, rounds out the story I wish to share with you tonight. Let me repeat. I find strength in the fact that the aims and principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations are identical with those of the American people, and that they express accurately the hopes of all other democratic peoples. The basic fault is not in the Charter, but in the fact that some of its Members continue to employ undemocratic methods of force and coercion to achieve their international goals. But the longer the issues are debated, the more clear it becomes to all the world, including increasing numbers of people behind the Iron Curtain, that the basic issue involved is morality in international conduct against immorality, national independence against subservience to an alien rule, and human liberty against the subjection of this individual to the dictates of a ruling clique.

Progress is being made, and with a steadfast conviction in the superiority of democratic principles over any other system of conduct yet devised, we shall succeed in building a world order which will stand in the noonday sun, strong and firm on its solid support—the people of the United Nations.

WHY WE SUPPORT THE UNITED NATIONS

By Ambassador Warren R. Austin¹

Today marks the first official, world-wide observance of United Nations Day, designated by unanimous recommendation of the General Assembly in 1947. On this day people are gathered in all parts of the world to discuss problems before the United Nations and to express their determination, in the words of the Charter, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war".

It is fitting that this world-wide testimony to humanity's greatest hope for peace, the United Nations Charter, should occur on the day dedicated to the one Father of all mankind; it is fitting that this observance should fall on the day of prayer, and that mankind's prayers for peace and justice are rising in unison around the earth.

I feel greatly honored to have a part in Britain's observance of this universal holiday in Central Hall, Westminster, in which the organization began its life. It was the people of this island whose valor and determination in the darkest hours made possible the victory from which emerged the United Nations. Faced, as we now are, with the certainty that the development of the United Nations will require from all of us much of the same spirit, I feel especially privileged to observe this day with people who, in our time, have so distinctly identified their country with qualities of faith and courage.

The people of my country cherish the partnership with you that helped create the United Nations. We are united in our desire to see that partnership grow in collective effort to strengthen the United Nations.

Today, in the United States, our national election campaign is suspended so that people may join in rallies in every state to manifest support for the United Nations. It provides us with another opportunity to demonstrate that our participation in the United Nations is based on the national will, and not on the platform of any one political party. Both major parties have published pledges to support the United Nations.

The Democratic platform states: "We support the United Nations fully and we pledge whole-hearted aid toward its growth and development."

The Republican platform provides: "We believe in collective security against aggression and in behalf of justice and freedom. We shall support the United Nations—the world's best hope in this direction, striving to strengthen it and promote its effective evolution and use."

The United States Delegation in Paris is a bipartisan delegation and the policies of that delegation have not become the subject of partisan debate in the election campaign now nearing its end. Our people are able to observe at close range the growth of the organization from its beginnings in the Dumbarton Oaks conversations through the writing of the Charter, on our Pacific Coast, to the establishment of its home on our Atlantic Coast. Our students, editors, political leaders, and public visit sessions of the General Assembly, Security Council, Trusteeship Council, Economic and Social Council, and other agencies of the United Nations. They return to their communities with firsthand reports of how representatives of 58 nations are progressing with their work. This all makes the United Nations very real to our people.

One reason we are glad that the General Assembly is being held in Paris this year is that it is giving the people of Europe a better opportunity to visit its sessions, and to feel their intimate relation to it. There is an inherent basis for the American support of the United Nations. During most of our history, we have been receiving the sons and daughters of all nations, and especially from Europe. We have become a United Nations country, exemplifying that men of every nationality, religion, color, and race can live together in peace, and cooperate for the welfare of all. I would not imply that we have achieved our ideal. Our efforts to insure the fulfillment of the guaranties of equal rights must be pursued endlessly, and with enlightened vigilance. Our own difficulties make us keenly sensitive to the tremendous task faced by nations in building the envisioned world community, and they give us the patience necessary to reach that goal. Many of these people who came to the United States were bitter over the wars and quarrels of Europe. They had turned their backs on the old world and dreamed of building a new world in splendid isolation.

Through hard experience the American people came to realize that in an interdependent world no nation can escape the consequences of war, and every nation depends to some extent on world order for its own social and economic well-being. Once having reached this conviction, the overwhelming majority of the American people demanded full

¹ Address made at Central Hall, Westminster, London, Oct. 24, 1948, and released to the press on the same date.

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United States participation in the United Nations, and they have supported every measure for collective security and international economic cooperation.

I realize what the experience of Europeans has been. They had high hopes of outlawing war and building collective security through the League. They gave support to that first effort to build a world organization. They were disappointed and disillusioned when the Senate of the United States held aloof from the League. Their hopes were dashed as the League failed to stand by the covenant when Mussolini attacked Ethiopia, when Japan moved into Manchuria, when the Nazis seized the Rhineland, then Austria and Czechoslovakia.

To my mind the great difference between the 1930's and the present is that then the majority of the League members were falling apart to become, one by one, victims of aggression; while today the majority of the members of the United Nations are closing ranks to create a united front against aggression. That difference is so important as to justify a real hope for the efforts in which we are now engaged to avoid war.

Our difficulties are so obvious and complex as to provoke skepticism in some, but they challenge the great interest and effort of an increasing majority.

Just two days ago, we were greatly strengthened by the achievements of one day:

The Security Council elected five judges to the International Court of Justice, the General Assembly did likewise, revealing a high degree of accord between East and West.

The Political and Security Committee, after thorough debate, agreed upon the Mexican resolution with unanimity of the 58 members. (The conference broke into animated applause at this heart-warming accomplishment.) The resolution recalled faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter; the pledge of the members in the United Nations and proclaimed that only with continuing and growing cooperation and understanding among the three countries which made the Yalta Declaration, and among all the peace-loving nations, could the higher aspirations of humanity be realized.

One of the contributions to wider cooperation was made by the Soviet Union in the Subcommittee. It initiated paragraph 4 of the Mexican draft recommending that the powers signatory to the agreement of December 1945, and the powers which subsequently acceded thereto, "associate with them in the performance of such a noble task (the settlement of the war and the conclusion of all the peace settlements) the states which subscribed and adhered to the Washington Declaration of January 1, 1942."

The Security Council, considering the Berlin question, by unanimous consent, tabled a resolution which was proposed by the six neutral members. We prayerfully look forward to the consideration of that resolution next week.

As I left Paris for this meeting, I received official notification, as President of the Security Council, that its resolution for an immediate and effective cease-fire in the Negeb, has been obeyed by both Jews and Arabs.

We do not serve our cause by overestimating short-run gains, nor by underestimating the long-range difficulties. But, as we advance toward collective security, step by step we grow more efficient with each succeeding accomplishment.

We created and set in motion the most ambitious organization for peace ever conceived. We built up an efficient Secretariat, introduced novel methods of breaking down barriers of language, developed fact-finding facilities, and arsenals of information for combating such ancient causes of war as disease, hunger, and ignorance. We created commissions and specialized agencies to deal with the whole range of vital problems through international consultation; the problems of control of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction; of reduction and regulation of armaments; of human rights; of finance and trade; of health and narcotics; of food and agriculture; of economics and employment; of education, science, and culture; of labor standards; of displaced and stateless persons.

The fact that we have a vast international organization, this year holding more than 5,000 meetings in various places throughout the world, enables us to see in bold relief the differences and tensions between nations as they appear.

I should like to discuss with you frankly these tensions, to suggest action to relieve them, and thus hasten the realization of collective security as envisaged in the United Nations Charter.

A great part of the tension in the United Nations grows out of the fact that economic and social instability in the wake of the war has favored the growth of Communist parties in many countries. Communist leaders in these countries try to exploit chaotic conditions to seize power. In those countries where Communists have been able to call upon the Red Army either for direct help or as an imminent threat, they have succeeded. It is significant that they have succeeded nowhere else. But, as country after country has fallen under Soviet domination, and as Communist parties in other countries have demonstrated their role as Moscow-directed fifth columns, the black cloud of fear has spread over all of Western Europe and has darkened the horizon of the United Nations.

These fears and their causes were laid before the General Assembly with directness and candor in

two brilliant speeches: one by Mr. Spaak, Prime Minister of Belgium; the other by Mr. Bevin, your Foreign Minister.

Our failure to support the balance of power existing at the time the Charter was signed has been a contributing factor. The rapid demobilization of our armies enabled the Kremlin to extend its domination, to encourage paralysis rather than productivity, to spread fear where there should have been hope.

We expected, when the Charter was signed at San Francisco, that force would cease to be the dominant factor in relations between nations. This hope sprang from the heart of a nation which then possessed the greatest concentration of military power the world has ever seen. We hoped and believed that in seeking solutions for postwar problems, our war-born unity would be maintained. And so, our country, like yours, demobilized with reckless velocity. It has been a bitter and, in many respects, costly lesson.

I believe there will be peace, because this time we are making perfectly clear, in advance, that we are not willing to submit to extortion as the price of peace. I believe there will be peace, because of the firm and determined unity which exists between our two countries and with France; and because this unity is receiving support from an overwhelming majority in the United Nations.

I perceive a new hope arising in the General Assembly now meeting in Paris. It grows from the increasing readiness of the many to unite against the threats and crude tactics of the few

The Member states, and particularly the states of Western Europe, are speaking plainly and persuasively. The kind of tension which results from knowing the truth and being fearful of the results of expressing it, has been broken in Paris.

I am persuaded that once the unity of the many has been demonstrated persuasively to the few, they will seek constructive solution through collaboration. The Second World War might have been prevented if the aggressors had been convinced at the outset of the eventual unity of the many defenders. Real unity of the majority and expression of it in the United Nations, in the presence of the minority, offers our best hope of eventual peaceful settlement.

The United States does not seek to promote uniformity in the United Nations. We do not seek to promote any particular political or economic system in individual Member states. But we do seek to make it possible for free nations to plan a peaceful future, in association with others if they wish, but without fear or coercion. We do seek the creation of conditions in which nations are able to safeguard their freedom against aggression. We do seek the creation of conditions in which the re-

sources, skills, and tools of the twentieth century may freely be employed for the greater benefit of mankind.

Each nation has the right to choose the method by which it shall work toward the common objective. No nation has the right to insist that its method is the only method. No nation has the right to undermine the common objective of a peaceful world providing better life and larger freedoms for all.

The spirit of hope which I perceive in the General Assembly is based also on the fact that Western Europe in which we meet is now headed toward economic reconstruction and self-reliance. The European Recovery Program is just beginning to be felt, but signs are unmistakable that the common effort is succeeding.

You know of the success that is flowing from your own efforts here in Britain. It is important to realize that collective effort is producing collective results in steel production. A good yardstick of this is provided by Sweden and the Bizonal area of Germany which have exceeded, as you have, the quotas set for the first six months of this year. They have surpassed their goals by 18 percent; Belgium has done the same by 4 percent; Italy by 2 percent; Austria by 34 percent. The Economic Committee for Europe estimated that steel production for all of Europe this year will exceed 1947 by 11 million tons, and will exceed the production quota by 4 million tons.

You have cut your trade deficit by over half for the first six months of this year. Greece reports great progress in rebuilding its transportation system. Petroleum refining is on the increase in France. Harvests are promising, and the increased amount of farm machinery is helping to insure the full realization of crop possibilities.

This is your handiwork. This is the product of your skills, your management, your patience and hard work. We in the United States have assisted financially and technically in great measure, and the labor of our workers and our farmers has come to your support. Nevertheless, it is primarily your accomplishment. We cannot today predict the full results, but of this we can be sure: rising internal strength for the European Members of the United Nations not only strengthens collective security, but reduces chaos and misery exploited for totalitarian aggrandizement.

We have great cause to be encouraged, but we have little cause to be satisfied. The unity that has brought us thus far must be strengthened and extended. I hope the economic and political cooperation now under way in Western Europe can be regarded as only the beginning of a movement toward European solidarity.

Plans for collective self-defense contained in the Brussels pact should be carried forward. The

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principle of progressively developing regional and other collective efforts for self-defense, as defined in the so-called Vandenberg resolution, approved by our Senate with only three dissenting votes, should be implemented.

The efforts to strengthen the United Nations must be continued on many fronts, among them the inter-American front. It means, also, unrelaxed effort to restrict the application of the veto, to provide contingents of armed forces available on call of the Security Council, to obtain agreement on an effective, enforceable system for the international control of atomic energy. And it means unrelenting support of economic and social projects sponsored by the United Nations through specialized agencies.

We can do no less if we are to fulfill the solemn

pledges made in signing the Charter at San Francisco. Nothing has occurred in the intervening years to change the principles we there espoused. Nothing can ever occur to change the eternal principles animating the Charter. The principle of the Fatherhood of the Most High and the brotherhood of man, regardless of race, creed, or religion, is eternal. The changes which will occur will be the result of mankind's spiritual progress in his struggles toward that goal—for perfection alone is invulnerable.

May the prayers of this day, rising from the hearts of all mankind, be felt in the United Nations. May we receive from this day's rededication to the Charter new courage and inspiration for the long task of building a just, abundant, and peaceful world.

The United States in the United Nations

Palestine

[October 23-29]

The Security Council on October 26 opened debate on Egypt's charges that Israel was "constantly and increasingly" violating the recent Negev cease-fire order, but adjourned until October 28 without taking action.

The Palestine situation was taken up at an emergency session called to weigh Egypt's allegations. Lebanon and Syria also demanded that the Council order Israel to give up territory gained in the desert fighting since the most recent outbreak on October 14. Egypt agreed to withdraw its troops to positions occupied on October 14, as the embattled contestants were asked to do by Ralph Bunche, acting U.N. mediator for Palestine.

Great Britain and China proposed on October 28 that the Security Council consider sanctions against Israel or Egypt, or both, if they fail to withdraw their military forces in Palestine's Negev area to positions occupied before the recent outbreak of fighting.

The Security Council agreed without objection to postpone until October 29 a vote on the proposal, which calls for appointment of a seven-nation committee to study application of sanctions as permitted under article 41 of the Charter.

In submitting the sanction proposal, Dr. Tingfu Tsiang (China) and Sir Alexander Cadogan (U.K.) stressed the fundamental principle of the Palestine truce that no military advantage should accrue to either side. They said the aim was to stabilize the Palestine situation until a final solution could be found.

Ralph Bunche told the Security Council that each side of the Palestine controversy was guilty of what he termed an effort to "win the war under the enforced truce". The acting mediator reported that as a result of the recent outbreak of fighting the dispositions of the opposing troops were such that an early reopening of hostilities was likely unless truce lines were reestablished quickly.

Dr. Bunche maintained that what is desperately needed now is a means of transition from what he described as a tenuous truce to permanent peace. The parties themselves do not seem to be able to accomplish this, he asserted. He added:

"The truce in Palestine has now endured almost five months. During this period, the war has been held in abeyance by the firm intervention of the United Nations. But it cannot be reasonably expected that this phase can endure indefinitely."

He expressed belief that "the critical stage has now been reached where bolder, broader action is

required. Such action should take the form of a clear and forceful declaration by the Security Council that the parties be required to negotiate, either directly or through truce supervision, organized settlement of all outstanding problems of the truce in all sectors of Palestine with a view to achieving a permanent condition of peace in place of the existing truce.

"Such negotiation would necessarily aim at formal peace or, at the minimum, an armistice would involve either complete withdrawal and demobilization of armed forces, or their wide separation by the creation of broad demilitarized zones under U.N. supervision."

On October 29 a five-nation subcommittee of the Security Council in Paris was set up to consider several amendments to the joint British-Chinese proposal calling for a study of the possibility of imposing sanctions in the Palestine situation.

The subgroup, consisting of the United Kingdom, China, France, Belgium, and the Ukraine, is not expected to be able to consider all the amendments and prepare a revised resolution before November 2. After creation of the subcommittee, the council rejected a Syrian effort to force further discussion on October 30 and adjourned indefinitely. It will be recalled on the Palestine issue when the subcommittee notifies the Council president that the revised draft is ready. Canada suggested establishment of the subcommittee.

The Berlin Crisis

The Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and France on October 27 reaffirmed their countries' willingness to carry out the proposals embodied in the resolution by which the Security Council sought to settle the Berlin crisis but which the Soviet Union vetoed.

After conferring for an hour, the Western powers' Foreign Ministers issued the following statement:

"The three Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France considered the situation produced by the Soviet veto of the Security Council resolution regarding the Berlin question.

"As is known, the three Governments accepted that resolution and declared their readiness to carry it out loyally, and they stand by their expressed willingness to be guided by the principles embodied therein.

"The question is still on the agenda of the Security Council. The three Governments are ready to continue to fulfil their obligations and to discharge their responsibilities as members of that

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body, which is still in a position to consider any development in the situation."

The six neutral nations of the Security Council, which had been trying for weeks to find an answer to the perplexing Berlin question, submitted on October 25 a four-point resolution aimed at amicable settlement of the controversy between the Western powers and the U.S.S.R.¹

Nine of the Security Council's 11 members, including the Western powers, voted in favor of the proposal; the Soviet Union and the Ukraine opposed the resolution.

The vetoed resolution called on the Four Powers to avoid acts which might aggravate the Berlin situation; lift immediately all restrictions on commerce, transportation, and communications between Berlin and the four zones of occupation; call an immediate meeting of the four Military Governors in Berlin to arrange for unification of the city's currency by November 20; and convene the Council of Foreign Ministers to consider the entire German question within 10 days of fulfillment of the measures called for in connection with the Berlin issue.

Reduction of Arms

An 11-nation U.N. Subcommittee on October 25 adopted a Belgian resolution which would have the Security Council direct its Conventional Armaments Commission to continue the study of world arms reduction, emphasizing the need for an international control system for atomic energy use and for a close check on conventional armaments of all nations.

The Subcommittee of the Assembly's Political and Security Committee also rejected a Soviet proposal for one-third arms cut by permanent Members of the Security Council and the prohibition of atomic weapons. The vote was 6 to 2: the United States, Great Britain, France, Brazil, Belgium, and China voting affirmatively, the Soviet Union and Poland opposing; Lebanon and Australia abstaining.

The Belgian plan was approved paragraph by paragraph, with the Soviet Union and Poland opposing on every vote.

Immediately after the balloting on the two draft resolutions, the Polish Representative submitted another proposal which he said would meet general agreement. It was a combination of the defeated Soviet resolution and a Lebanese plan, which had earlier been withdrawn. It will be submitted in writing on Tuesday and acted upon by the Subcommittee on Wednesday.

The United States was among the nations supporting the Belgian proposal, which in effect replaced a French draft previously under consideration, which the United States had sought to amend to emphasize the need for world control of atomic energy along with conventional arms regulation.

On that score, the Belgian draft accepted today reads that:

. . . the aim of the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces can only be attained in an atmosphere of real and lasting improvement in international relations, which implies in particular the application of control of atomic energy involving the prohibition of the atomic weapon.

The resolution continues:

But noting on the other hand that this renewal of confidence would be greatly encouraged if states were placed in possession of precise and verified data as to the level of their respective armaments;

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Recommends the Security Council to pursue the study of the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments in order to obtain concrete results in implementing Article 26 of the Charter as soon as the improvement in the international atmosphere permits;

Trusts that the Commission for Conventional Armaments, in carrying out its program, will devote its main attention to formulating proposals for the receipt, checking and publication by an international organ of control endowed with universally accepted powers, of full information to be supplied by member states with regard to their effectiveness and their conventional armaments;

Invites the Security Council to report to it no later than its next regular session on the effect given to the present recommendation with a view to enabling it to continue its activity with regard to the regulation of armaments in accordance with the purposes and principles defined in the Charter.

The Conventional Armaments Commission has reported that it considered it futile to continue discussions, since the Soviet Union has refused to accept the majority wishes on any arms-reduction plan.

The Polish resolution, hastily offered, calls upon permanent Security Council Members to take the initiative by reducing in the course of one year all land, naval, and air forces, and to implement measures for arms cuts and for prohibition of atomic weapons. It would also establish within the Security Council an international control body to which full official data on arms and armed forces of the five major powers would be submitted.

United Nations

The Polish proposal for a reduction in armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons was rejected on October 27 by the Subcommittee on Disarmament Proposals set up by the U.N. Assembly Political Committee.

The Polish proposal, backed by the Soviet Union, was along the lines of the Soviet proposal turned down earlier during the week by the subcommittee. The vote was 6 to 2 with France, Lebanon, and Australia abstaining.

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 24, 1948, p. 520.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

High Frequency Broadcasting

President Truman approved on October 19 the nominations of R. Henry Norweb, Special Ambassador, as chairman and George E. Sterling, Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission, as vice chairman of the United States Delegation to the second session of the International Conference on High Frequency Broadcasting called by the International Telecommunication Union. The Conference is scheduled to open at Mexico City on October 22. Named by the President to serve as delegates are:

Francis Colt de Wolf, Chief, Telecommunications Division, Department of State
Ernest W. McFarland, United States Senator
A. Gael Simson, Consultant, Communications Liaison Branch, Department of the Army
Charles W. Tobey, United States Senator
Fred H. Trimmer, Chief, Facilities Planning Branch, Division of International Broadcasting, Department of State

The other members of the United States Delegation are as follows:

Advisors

Edward Cooper, Secretary, Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Louis E. DeLaFleur, Assistant Chief, Frequency Allocation and Treaty Division, Federal Communications Commission
Mucio Delgado, Chief, Radio Program Branch, Division of International Broadcasting, Department of State
Raymond L. Harrell, Telecommunications Attaché, American Embassy, Habana, Cuba
Perry Harten, Chief, Studio Operation, Division of International Broadcasting, Department of State
Jack W. Herbstreit, Assistant Chief, Frequency Utilization Research Section, Central Radio Propagation Laboratories, National Bureau of Standards
Howard Hotchner, Assistant Chief, Broadcast Division, Division of International Broadcasting, Department of State
Joseph M. Kittner, Assistant to the General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission
Roger C. Legge, Jr., Propagation Analyst, Division of International Broadcasting, Department of State
Curtis B. Plummer, Chief, Television Broadcast Division, Federal Communications Commission
Dudley G. Singer, Attaché, American Embassy, Mexico, D.F.
A. Prose Walker, Chief, Allocations Section, Television Broadcast Division, Federal Communications Commission

Industry Advisers

Walter E. Benoit, Member of the Board of Directors, Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc.
Charles B. Denny, Executive Vice President, National Broadcasting Company, Inc.
Royal V. Howard, Director of Engineering, National Association of Broadcasters
George Edward Hughes, Vice President, Director of International Broadcasting, Associated Broadcasters Inc.
Walter S. Lemmon, President, World Wide Broadcasting Foundation
Louis Henry MacDonald, Chief Engineer, World Wide Broadcasting Foundation
Justin Miller, President, National Association of Broadcasters
Don E. Petty, General Counsel, National Association of Broadcasters
Forney A. Rankin, Executive Assistant to the President, National Association of Broadcasters
James P. Veatch, Manager, Washington Office of the Frequency Bureau, Laboratories Division, Radio Corporation of America

Press Liaison Officer

Dorsey Fisher, First Secretary and Public Affairs Officer, American Embassy, Mexico, D.F.

Secretary of the Delegation

Ellis K. Allison, Division of International Conferences, Department of State

Special Assistant to the Chairman

Vivian N. Cartwright, Special Assistant to the Chief, International Radio Frequencies Section, Division of International Broadcasting, Department of State

The first session of the International Conference on High Frequency Broadcasting held at Atlantic City, August-October 1947, voted to hold the second session of the Conference at Mexico City. It also established a Planning Committee for the Conference. The Planning Committee held meetings at Geneva in the spring of this year and at Mexico City beginning on September 13.

The aim of the forthcoming Conference is two-fold: the first is to work out a plan of frequency allocations within the bands of the radio spectrum set aside for high-frequency broadcasting by the International Radio Conference at Atlantic City in 1947, and the second is to agree upon a convention which would establish an international organization to have cognizance of high-frequency broadcasting. The plan drawn up by the Conference will be forwarded to the Provisional Frequency Board of the International Telecommunication Union for inclusion in a report to a special administrative conference which will consider

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these recommendations to complete the reallocation of the entire radio-frequency spectrum.

The high-frequency (short-wave) broadcasting is greatly used by many nations for broadcasting to other countries. It is within these bands that the Voice of America conducts its broadcasting.

Meteorological

The designation of Norman R. Hagen, meteorological attaché, American Embassy, London, as United States Delegate to the meeting of the Regional Commission for Asia of the International Meteorological Organization (Imo) was announced by the Department of State on October 30. This meeting is scheduled to be held at New Delhi, India, November 10-17, 1948.

The purpose of the meeting is to promote the maximum degree of coordination and standardization among the meteorological services on the Continent of Asia. The Asian meeting is of particular interest to the United States since the U.S. Weather Bureau operates meteorological stations and offices in the Pacific which depend upon weather reports from the Asian area.

Included on the agenda are these topics: (1) network of stations; (2) meteorological reconnaissance flights over sea areas; (3) times of observation to be adopted in the region with reference to the Imo recommendations; (4) marine meteorology; (5) telecommunications; and (6) broadcasts.

Invitations to attend the forthcoming meeting have been extended by the Government of India to those governments that are members of the Regional Commission for Asia, and to those border countries which have expressed their desire to be represented at the meetings of the Commission.

The Regional Commission for Asia is one of six such commissions established by the Imo to deal with meteorological problems on a regional basis.

Semiannual Meeting of International Joint Commission Held

[Released to the press October 18]

The International Joint Commission met in executive session in the Victoria Building, Ottawa, Ontario, on October 12 and 13. George Spence of Regina, Saskatchewan, was acting chairman for Canada. A. O. Stanley, of Washington, was chairman of the United States Section. Commissioners Roger B. McWhorter and Eugene Weber, both of Washington, were also present.

Mr. Weber, who has been recently appointed, took the oath of office.

Members of the International Columbia River Engineering Board, composed of members acting

for the United States and Canada, were present, as follows:

Victor Meek, Department of Mines and Resources, Ottawa
F. G. Goodspeed, Department of Public Works, Ottawa
Maj. Gen. R. C. Crawford, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Department of the Army, Washington
C. G. Paulsen, Geological Survey, Department of the Interior, Washington

Victor Meek, chairman of the Canadian Section of the Board, summarized its progress report for the preceding six months. He called attention to the work that has been carried on in British Columbia, Idaho, and Montana in respect to flood control on the Kootenay River, drilling operations for dams, and surveys of potential dam sites. The report stated that the Corps of Engineers' report (Seattle District) on the Libby Dam site has been forwarded to Washington and is under study there by the Department of the Army.

A report was submitted by the International Souris-Red Rivers Engineering Board, the members of which are as follows:

J. W. Dixon, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior, Washington
Maj. Gen. R. C. Crawford, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Department of the Army, Washington
C. G. Paulsen, Geological Survey, Department of the Interior, Washington
Victor Meek, Department of Mines and Resources, Ottawa
A. L. Stevenson, Department of Agriculture, Ottawa
T. M. Patterson, Department of Mines and Resources, Ottawa

The progress report, which covered the period April-September, set forth the studies that are to be made in connection with the Red River of the North, with a view to flood control. This work will include studies to prevent floods such as those which have recently done so much damage in the City of Winnipeg. It was decided that the investigations should cover measures for the elimination of pollution.

A progress report was also submitted from the International Waterton-Belly Rivers Engineering Board, composed of the same members as the International Souris-Red Rivers Engineering Board. The report outlined the investigations that had been conducted in the basins of these rivers in the United States and Canada, covering the installation of gauging stations, the activities of the engineers of both Governments during the preceding six months, and the collection of data respecting the present and future uses of the waters of these streams.

The Commission decided to have further hearings at Detroit, Michigan, on November 15 and 16, and at Windsor, Ontario, on November 17, 18, 19, and 20, on the references of the Governments of the United States and Canada in the matter of the pollution of St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair, and Detroit River. A hearing will also be held at Sault

Ste. Marie, Ontario, on November 22, in regard to the pollution of St. Mary's River.

The report of the International Souris River Board of Control in regard to a number of small applications from the Province of Saskatchewan for the use of waters of the Souris River was discussed, and the applications were approved by the Commission.

H. van Zile Hyde Appointed U.S. Representative to WHO Executive Board

[Released to the press October 18]

The recess appointment by the President of Dr. H. van Zile Hyde as United States Representative to the executive board, World Health Organization, was announced on October 18 by the White House.

The President also approved the appointment of Dr. Wilton L. Halverson, Director of Health of the State of California, as alternate United States representative to the second session of the executive board, which is scheduled to meet at Geneva beginning October 25. Dr. Hyde, Senior Surgeon of the United States Public Health Service and Assistant Chief of the Health Branch, Office of United Nations Affairs, Department of State, and Dr. Halverson will be accompanied by Howard B. Calderwood of the Department of State, who will serve as adviser on the United States Delegation.

All three were members of the United States Delegation to the First World Health Assembly, which met at Geneva last June.

Informal Participation in Bolivian International Fair

[Released to the press October 21]

The United States Government will participate informally through the American Embassy at La Paz, in the Bolivian International Fair (La Paz Quatro-Centenary Exposition) and has sent a number of technical documentary films and historical pictures of the United States to La Paz for display. This exposition, which opened October 20, 1948, and will probably continue until the end of the year, commemorates the 400th anniversary of the founding of the city of La Paz in October 1548 by Alonso de Mendoza, an officer in the Spanish Army. Most of the nations with which Bolivia maintains diplomatic relations have been invited to exhibit the products of their industries.

Several American business firms at La Paz have leased a pavilion at the site of the fair. These firms with other industrial corporations will exhibit their products in this building known as the "American Pavilion". A room has been set aside in this building for the picture display and the showing of the American Government films.

THE RECORD OF THE WEEK

U.S.-U.K. Zone of Trieste Admitted to OEEC Membership and ECA Bilateral Agreement Concluded

[Released to the press October 18]

The Council of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation on October 14 admitted the U.S.-U.K. zone, Free Territory of Trieste, to membership in that organization. In addition, an economic cooperation agreement was concluded October 17 in Trieste between the U.S. Government and the commander of the zone. This agreement follows closely the pattern of agreements already concluded between the U.S. Government and other participating countries, with appropriate modifications to take into account the special status of Trieste as provided in the treaty of peace with Italy.

Assistance to the U.S.-U.K. zone of Trieste from the United States has until now been on a relief basis, limited to the goods required to assure the population the necessities of life and prevent eco-

nomic retrogression. Now the zone is embarking upon a recovery program which will encourage the rehabilitation of its economic life. By joining in cooperative efforts with the other participating countries the zone will also benefit from the strengthening of economic relations which were of such importance to it in the past, and it will be enabled to make its contribution to European recovery.

Participation of the U.S.-U.K. zone in the recovery program will call for close and continual consultation between the zone and the Italian Government to assure that their programs take into account their common interests and that the terms of the economic agreements concluded between the zone and Italy under the provisional regime of the Free Territory are followed.

Recommendations on Problems of Educational Exchange With Eastern European Countries

REPORT OF THE U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

The United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange has given consideration, at the request of the Department of State, to problems of educational exchange as regards the countries of eastern Europe. We submit herewith our recommendations.¹

The educational exchange program is based upon the conviction long held and amply demonstrated by civilized nations that free interchange of persons and ideas between nations is a source of understanding, enrichment, and progress. Since the effectiveness of such a program will depend not only upon its range or extent but also upon the voluntary and unprejudiced spirit in which it is conducted, it is obvious that its greatest usefulness will be in relation to the free and democratic countries of the world which are glad to avail themselves of its reciprocal advantages.

Although this memorandum deals with the countries of eastern Europe, the Commission wishes to emphasize that, for reasons which will be cited, the program of educational exchange will be more limited in scope and immediate effectiveness in these barricaded regions of the world than is the case where normal and friendly contacts obtain.

The obstacles which have been placed in the way of educational and cultural exchanges by a number of the countries of eastern Europe are well known and need not be detailed. Many efforts have been made by official and voluntary agencies in this country to establish exchanges with these countries but with very few results. In authorizing this program, the Congress of the United States laid down in the Smith-Mundt Act the principle that all official exchanges should be upon a reciprocal basis. Since for the present most of the eastern European governments are unwilling to recipro-

cate, it is not recommended that the United States sponsor government-supported exchanges with them until their governments give evidence of co-operation in the mutually helpful and friendly spirit of the Act. This unwillingness to reciprocate will also currently exclude exchange with these countries under the Fulbright Act which requires negotiations by the governments involved with assurances that acceptable exchange projects in both directions can be initiated and carried out.

We have, however, many unofficial opportunities for contacts and exchange of persons with these countries. Not only students, scholars, and scientists are involved, but also representatives of the professions, such as journalism and medicine. While these exchanges are initiated and sponsored by voluntary agencies, the Department of State must make available the necessary travel papers, and it is often called upon to facilitate the exchanges in other ways. Should it do this?

The Advisory Commission, after a full study of the problem and of the difficulties involved is convinced that the United States Government should not close the door to these unofficial exchanges, and we so advise the Department of State. Our reasons for this are several.

In the first place, it is clear from the evidence submitted to us, that our experience in these exchanges, on the whole, has been a good one. While some difficulties have been encountered, the exchanges with eastern Europe have brought about the correction of erroneous beliefs about this country, and a greater appreciation of its institutions, and a more critical outlook toward totalitarian regimes.

This practical experience is strongly supported by certain general considerations. For the United States to close its doors to all contacts with those nations with whose philosophy it disagrees would be to pull down an iron curtain on our own side of the Atlantic, to adopt a policy which we condemn, and to lose in world opinion much of the moral leadership which this country has enjoyed. Many of our own nationals, furthermore, need upon occasion to visit the countries of eastern and southeastern Europe for business, journalistic, scholarly or other purposes. We cannot well request privileges which we in turn deny. These considerations, together with the positive gains which follow from such interchange in the correction of

¹ The Commission met for a two-day session on Oct. 18 and 19, 1948. The next meeting is to be held in Washington on Nov. 15, 1948. For a review of the first meeting of the Commission on Sept. 10, 1948, see Department of State publication 3313. This report was released on Oct. 19, 1948.

The Commission by resolution recommended that the Department of State use the Library of Congress and the National Gallery of Art as repositories for recovered cultural objects and works of art looted from the occupied areas, until these objects can be returned to their rightful owners at a time to be determined by the Department.

misinformation and the removal of prejudices seem to us to justify the maintenance of a broad policy of interchange. To cut off contacts with the totalitarian nations of the world because of fears as to what might happen to democratic institutions through such contacts would imply a weakness which has no justification in fact. No army ever burned its bridges except in retreat. The democratic way of life is not now in retreat.

Such an interchange of persons between the United States and the countries of eastern Europe obviously will require careful control.

American officers, responsible for issuing visas and permission to enter the United States should satisfy themselves, as far as possible, that individuals desiring to come to this country have no subversive intentions, but serious and *bona fide* academic, professional, or vocational purposes. Permits should be for not more than one year, though subject to renewal.

We do not recommend that the Department encourage immature and inexperienced American students to undertake study under present conditions in eastern Europe. Maturity of judgment and experience is desirable in order to appraise critically the instruction received, to profit most from the total experience, and to avoid personal episodes. In all cases of Americans permitted to travel in any of these countries, it is desirable that they be informed before departure as to conditions that they will encounter. We recommend that the State Department accept the responsibility for seeing that this is done. We believe that restriction of the travel of individuals entering the country or of Americans going abroad under the sponsorship of organizations recognized as subversive is desirable.

A special problem exists with reference to the holding of international conferences, congresses, and institutes. Many such meetings are held by reputable organizations which include as participants persons with conflicting political views. Present United States statutes and regulations governing the entrance of foreign nationals make it difficult for some of these persons to attend these meetings. This eliminates the United States as one of the meeting places for organizations of a widely international character. This is undesirable from many standpoints. We recommend that a more liberal policy be followed in granting permission to enter for individuals desiring to attend the reputable meetings of this kind.

Letters of Credence

Sweden

The newly appointed Ambassador of Sweden, Erik C. Boheman, presented his credentials to the

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President on October 20. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 854 of October 20, 1948.

Claims Settlement Agreement Between U.S., France, and Australia

[Released to the press October 19]

An agreement was entered into on October 19 by the United States, France, and Australia setting forth a procedure for settlement of cargo claims arising out of the requisitioning by the United States of the S. S. *Maréchal Joffre*, a French vessel which was loading general commercial cargo in the Philippines at the time of the Japanese attack in December 1941. The vessel was taken by the United States Navy to Australia, where its cargo was unloaded, and it was then pressed into service in the interest of the war effort.

Under the agreement which implements a general agreement forming part of the lend-lease and claims settlement with France of May 28, 1946, the French Government will settle claims of all owners of cargo landed in Australia and will pay United States citizens in dollars.¹ Australia will turn over to the French Government the proceeds, in Australian pounds, of sales of items in the cargo which they effected after unloading in Australia.

The agreement was signed on behalf of the United States by Under Secretary Robert A. Lovett; by Henri Bonnet, the French Ambassador, on behalf of France; and by Norman J. O. Makin, the Australian Ambassador, on behalf of Australia.

Visit of Secretary Marshall to Greece

Secretary Marshall arrived in Athens on October 16 and was greeted at the airport by Prime Minister Sophoulis. The Secretary told a press conference on October 18 that "we are deeply concerned in the desire to be of assistance to the rehabilitation of Greece".

In connection with Secretary Marshall's visit the following statement was released to the press in Athens on October 18:

"The Secretary has been trying to get to Greece for some time. The United States has assumed heavy commitments and heavy responsibilities in this area in which he is officially much involved. He had planned the trip for last week end but he left for Washington last Friday."

¹ BULLETIN of June 9, 1946, p. 994, and June 30, 1946, p. 1127.

THE RECORD OF THE WEEK

"This is a difficult time to leave Paris with Berlin and the atomic questions being actively discussed and Palestine coming up shortly.

"It did not appear that a longer wait would offer a more propitious time for a visit so he decided to come this week end.

"He is very happy to have even this very brief visit to Greece."

The Greek Prime Minister accompanied Secretary Marshall to the airport when he departed on October 18.

Uprising in Korea Reported

[Released to the press October 21]

The Department of State has received a report from the United States Special Representative to Korea, John Muccio, that on the morning of October 20 Seoul received reports through Korean channels of an uprising in the port town of Yosu in the Cholla Namdo Province.

Mr. Muccio said that exact information was lacking but that it was fairly well established that while a battalion of the Fourteenth Korean Constabulary Regiment was being mustered for transfer to Cheju-do (an island off the coast) some 40 men mutinied. They were joined by an undetermined number of civilians. A group reportedly numbering 500 commandeered a train and headed for Sunchon.

No Americans, military or civilians, have been in any way involved.

U.S. To Investigate Mexican Charges of Illegal Entry of Mexican Workers

[Released to the press October 19]

The Chargé d'Affaires of Mexico in Washington called at the Department on October 18 to express the concern of the Mexican Government at the actions which he said were recently taken on the Mexican border near El Paso by United States immigration authorities in permitting and facilitating the illegal entry of Mexican farm workers into Texas. The Chargé pointed out that this action was in violation of the agreement entered into by the Governments of Mexico and the United States last February 21¹ and had not only caused surprise in Mexican official circles but was already creating widespread popular reaction. He pointed out further that the uncontrolled exodus of so many workers from northern Mexico represented serious economic loss to the agricultural production of that area and expressed the hope that

¹ BULLETIN of Mar. 7, 1948, p. 317.

² Proclamation 2819, 13 Fed. Reg. 6193.

prompt and effective action would be taken by the United States Government to rectify the matter. The Chargé said that his Government felt it had no other recourse than to consider the agreement of February 21 as abrogated because of the unilateral action on the part of this Government by certain United States officials.

Assurances were given to the Mexican Chargé d'Affaires that the matter would be immediately investigated by the Department in the hope of either making satisfactory explanations to the Mexican Government or taking such corrective measures as seemed necessary. The hope was expressed to the Mexican Chargé that, considering the traditional and deep feelings of cooperation and friendship between the two neighboring countries, everything should be done by both Governments to minimize the adverse effects of this incident. The Department is taking the matter up officially with other interested agencies of the Government.

Reciprocal Copyright Relations Between U.S. and the Philippine Republic

In an exchange of notes dated October 21, 1948, between Joaquin M. Elizalde, Philippine Ambassador at Washington, and Robert A. Lovett, Acting Secretary of State, there are set forth the conditions upon which the benefits of the copyright law of each country will be extended to authors and copyright proprietors who are citizens of the other country.

The note from the Philippine Ambassador is accompanied by a copy of a proclamation issued on October 21, 1948, by Elpidio Quirino, President of the Republic of the Philippines, according copyright privileges to authors and copyright proprietors of the United States. The note from the Acting Secretary of State to the Philippine Ambassador is accompanied by a copy of a proclamation issued on October 21, 1948, by the President of the United States pursuant to Public Law 281, 80th Congress (61 Stat. 652), extending to Philippine authors and copyright proprietors the benefits of the copyright law of the United States.²

For texts of the above-mentioned notes and accompanying proclamations see Department of State press release 855 of Oct. 21, 1948.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Closing of Consular Offices and Reopening of Office at Martinique

[Released to the press October 18]

A further realignment of posts in the Foreign Service was disclosed on October 18 with the reopening of one United States Consulate and the closing of two others. The one ordered reopened

is on the French-owned island of Martinique, in the West Indies. The two scheduled to close down are in Limerick, Ireland, and Bristol, England.

The decision to abandon the Consulate on Martinique was based primarily on efforts to effect budgetary savings, as announced less than a month ago; but since then representation made to the Department of State has brought about a change in plans. Martinique, it will be recalled, played an interesting role in the early part of World War II, when it was the outpost nearest to the United States of the Vichy government.

While the Consulate at Limerick is being closed, a small Foreign Service staff is to be retained at the nearby Shannon Airport, so that services regularly performed for Americans traveling overseas by air will not be curtailed. Normal business for Americans at Limerick has gone down since the end of the war and there are now less than 200 U.S. citizens residing in the Limerick area.

The Consulate at Bristol is being closed because a slackening in routine business there seems to make this an advisable place to cut Foreign Service expenses at a time of budgetary stringency.

THE DEPARTMENT

Appointment of Officers

William C. Johnstone, Jr., as Director of the Office of Educational Exchange, effective August 10, 1948.

Russell L. Riley as Executive Officer of the Office of Educational Exchange, effective June 23, 1948.

PUBLICATIONS

Department of State

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Report of the United States Library Mission To Advise on the Establishment of the National Diet Library of Japan. Far Eastern Series 27. Pub. 3200. 41 pp. 15¢.

Report submitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, February 8, 1948, on the services which an adequate national library may be expected to render to Japan; a summary of the proposals submitted by the Mission to the Diet Committees; and the text of the National Diet Library laws as enacted on February 4, 1948.

International Office of Public Health. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1754. Pub. 3212. 54 pp. 15¢.

Protocol Between the United States and Other Governments—Signed at New York July 22, 1946; ratification advised by the Senate of the United States July 19, 1947; ratified by the President of the United States July 28, 1947; ratification of the United States deposited with the United Nations at Lake Success August 7, 1947; proclaimed by the President of the United States May 10, 1948; entered into force October 20, 1947.

Exchange of Official Publications. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1767. Pub. 3235. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines—Effectuated by exchange of notes signed at Manila April 12 and June 7, 1948; entered into force June 7, 1948.

Cooperative Rubber Plantation Investigations. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1771. Pub. 3245. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement Between the United States and Haiti Amending Letter Agreement of January 24, 1941—Effectuated by exchange of notes, signed at Port-au-Prince February 3 and 11, 1948; entered into force February 11, 1948.

Economic Cooperation with Norway Under Public Law 472—80th Congress. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1792. Pub. 3254. 53 pp. 15¢.

Agreement Between the United States and Norway—Signed at Oslo July 3, 1948; entered into force July 3, 1948.

Economic Cooperation with the Netherlands Under Public Law 472—80th Congress. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1791. Pub. 3266. 63 pp. 20¢.

Agreement Between the United States and the Netherlands—Signed at The Hague July 2, 1948; entered into force July 2, 1948.

Selected Publications and Materials Relating to American Foreign Policy. October 1948. Pub. 3304. 26 pp. Free.

List of Department of State publications relating to U. S. participation in the United Nations and its specialized agencies, to the making of the peace, the occupation of Germany and Japan, and economic reconstruction.

Korea, 1945 to 1948. Far Eastern Series 28. Pub. 3305. 124 pp. 25¢.

A report on political developments and economic resources, with selected documents.

International Educational Exchange; United States Advisory Commission and the Program of the Department of State. International Information and Cultural Series 3. Pub. 3313. 10 pp. Free.

Report of the 1st meeting of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange and a brief résumé of the international exchange program of the Department of State.

THE CONGRESS

Foreign Aid Appropriation Act, 1949. S. Rept. 1626, 80th Cong., 2d sess., to accompany H. R. 6801. 17 pp.

Authorizing the Secretary of State To Perform Certain Consular-Type Functions. S. Rept. 1759, 80th Cong., 2d sess., to accompany H. R. 4330. 2 pp.

Investigation of Federal Employees Loyalty Program. Interim Report of the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, pursuant to S. Res. 189 (80th Cong.), a resolution authorizing the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments to carry out certain duties. S. Rept. 1775, 80th Cong., 2d sess. iii, 29 pp.

Summary of the Legislative Record of the Eightieth Congress, Second Session, Together With a Statement Relative Thereto Pursuant to a Request of the Honorable Alben W. Barkley, United States Senator From Kentucky. S. Doc. 203, 80th Cong., 2d sess. ii, 38 pp.

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